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Abstract  
 
This study analyzes the relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and the variation 
of within-firm pay gaps by combining data on regional votes on gender equality laws with a 
data set of multi-establishments firms and their workers. The data set allows us for the first 
time to study gender pay gaps within the same firm across establishments located in regions 
with varying discriminatory social attitudes. Our results show that firms have larger pay gaps 
in regions with stronger discriminatory social attitudes. This result remains robust when we 
account for detailed worker and job characteristics and prevails for different subsamples. 
Thus we show that a relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and gender pay gaps 
prevails even after accounting for the sorting of women and men into different firms and 
occupations.  
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Introduction 
A number of recent empirical studies find evidence for a persistent and strong relationship 
between discriminatory social attitudes and gender (or racial) pay gaps. These gaps prevail 
even after accounting for detailed individual characteristics such as education, occupation, 
and marital status (e.g., Charles and Guryan 2008; Charles, Guryan, and Pan 2009; Fortin 
2005). Therefore, the authors typically interpret these results as evidence that social attitudes 
stipulate discriminatory pay gaps.1 
However, such results could also be explained by the decision of women themselves. If 
women respond to discriminatory social attitudes by following more traditional gender roles, 
the relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and gender pay gaps may be a 
consequence of women self-selecting into different types of firms. Women who follow 
traditional gender roles may prefer firms with family-friendly work practices that offer lower 
wages, may invest less in job search, or prefer low commuting costs over high wages (e.g., 
Bender, Donohue, and Heywood 2005; Heywood, Siebert and Wei 2007; Keith and 
McWilliams 1999; Pissarides and Wadsworth 1994). As prior studies did not account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity of firms, it remains unclear whether women who are exposed to 
discriminatory attitudes indeed receive lower wages than comparable male coworkers or 
whether those women simply work in firms that pay lower wages to all their workers. Thus it 
remains unclear how differences in discriminatory attitudes translate into wage gaps.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by studying gender wage gaps within firms but across 
establishments that are located in regions with distinct differences in discriminatory social 
attitudes. Doing so helps us to narrow down the number of explanations given in the previous 
literature. Thus far, few data sources have allowed researchers to observe variation in 
discriminatory attitudes within firms. Most studies rely on individual cross-section data 
without firm information, data that does not allow them to examine the effect of firms’ wage-
setting behavior. Therefore, we create a unique and innovative data source of multi-
establishment firms that operate in one country but in different regions, whose workers are 
therefore exposed to different levels of discriminatory attitudes towards gender equality.  
                                                            
1 We define discriminatory pay gaps as women and men receiving unequal pay for equal 
work. Discriminatory pay gaps may, for example, be the result of employer, coworker, or 
customer discrimination, but they may also be a consequence of women having worse 
bargaining power than men. 
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The advantage of our data is that it allows us to observe the wages and employment of 
different establishments that act under precisely the same national regulations and 
technological standards (because they operate during the same period in the same country, the 
same industry, and the same firm), but that are exposed to the influence of differing social 
attitudes (because these establishments are located in different regions with different social 
attitudes towards gender equality).  
To measure discriminatory social attitudes, we use two Swiss referenda on gender equality 
rights, both of which provide valid and highly reliable indicators. First, we follow Lalive and 
Stutzer (2010) by using information on regional votes on a 1981 amendment to the Swiss 
constitution on equal rights for women and men. Second, we use information on regional 
votes on a 2000 amendment to the Swiss constitution, stating that women should be fairly 
represented in the Federal administration. The outcomes of both referenda reliably measure 
regional differences in discriminatory social attitudes, because voters tend to reveal their true 
prejudices in secret votes with real legal consequences. We match the regional voting 
outcomes with the regional data of multi-establishments firms.  
The main findings of the paper are the following: First, we find a relatively large within-firm 
relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and the size of gender pay gaps 
across regions. The result prevails, even if we account for detailed observable worker and job 
characteristics. Moreover, we find no evidence that the regional sorting of firms with larger 
pay gaps in more discriminatory regions explains the within-firm correlation between 
discriminatory attitudes and firms’ gender pay gaps. As a consequence, our results suggest 
that—within the same firms—gender pay gaps are larger for branches in regions with more 
discriminatory attitudes than in regions with less discriminatory attitudes, i.e., the gender pay 
gap is larger in establishments in a region where more people tolerate gender inequality than 
in a region where fewer people tolerate gender inequality. 
Second, different industries may be exposed to different levels of product market 
concentration, which is likely to be a main determinant for an employer’s potentials to 
discriminate against women (e.g., Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 2002). Therefore, we 
also provide a separate analysis for broad industry classes, finding the largest effect for the 
manufacturing sector, followed by commerce sector and the banking sector. In comparison to 
other industries in Switzerland, the manufacturing industry is characterized by a much higher 
market concentration and larger barriers to entry. Thus the results are consistent with the idea 
that a firm’s product market power mitigates the relationship between social attitudes and 
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gender pay gaps. 
We thus show that discriminatory attitudes are related to larger gender pay gaps, even after 
we account for both the unobserved heterogeneity of firms and observable worker and job 
characteristics. Therefore, our results suggest that the sorting of women and men into 
different firms, occupations, and jobs alone cannot account for the relationship between social 
attitudes and gender pay gaps. In other words, women indeed appear to earn lower wages than 
comparable male coworkers in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights.  
Thus our results support a number of theories involving the discriminatory behavior of 
employers, manager, coworkers, or customers. If social attitudes, for example, stipulate the 
discriminatory tastes of local managers or customers, firms should pay more discriminatory 
wages in regions where more people oppose gender equality. To strategically adjust the pay-
setting to the local discriminatory environment may even be efficient for firms if markets are 
not perfectly competitive (e.g., Lang and Lehmann 2012; Rosén 1997). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the theoretical 
background. Section II presents the empirical model. Section III describes the voting and the 
firm data. Section IV presents the estimation results. Section V concludes.  
 
I. Why should social attitudes influence the pay-setting behavior of 
firms? 
A variety of mechanisms may cause a relationship between social attitudes toward gender 
equality and firms’ pay-setting behavior. To provide the theoretical framework for the 
interpretation of our results, we now discuss the three main channels presented in the 
literature: (1) employer discrimination, i.e., social attitudes toward gender equality shape the 
discriminatory behavior of employers and managers and their consequent pay-setting patterns; 
(2) customer and coworker discrimination, i.e., social attitudes shape the behavior of 
customers and coworkers, who are therefore more or less tolerant towards discrimination; and 
(3) inequality due to individual preferences, i.e., social attitudes change the individual 
worker’s preferences and behavior.  
Employer discrimination 
The most prominent theory for explaining the relationship between social attitudes towards 
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gender equality and the pay-setting behavior of firms is the theory of “taste-based 
discrimination” (Becker 1971). Becker's theory argues that employers, coworkers, or 
customers have a certain taste for discriminating against women. If utility-maximizing 
employers or managers have distastes for hiring women, they are willing to hire women only 
for a wage below their productivity. However, the employers’ taste for discrimination comes 
at a cost: Non-discriminatory firms can collect rents by hiring women for wages slightly 
above discriminatory wages. Therefore, competitive market forces must drive prejudice from 
the market such that the relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps disappears 
in the long run (Arrow 1972).  
However, a number of recent theoretical papers argue that gender pay gaps can persist if 
markets are not perfectly competitive (e.g., Black 1995; Hirsch 2009; Lang and Lehmann 
2012; Lang, Manove, and Dickens 2005; Rosén 1997; Rosén 2003; Sasaki 1999). For 
example, Black (1995) and Rosén (1997) develop equilibrium search models with prejudiced 
employers, who reduce outside options for all minority workers by influencing the number or 
quality of outside offers. If market frictions prevent the full segregation of the labor market, 
prejudiced firms survive and reduce women’s outside options. As a consequence, gender pay 
gaps persist, because non-prejudiced employers also gain rents by paying discriminatory 
wages. Thus if markets are not perfectly competitive, all firms benefit by paying relatively 
lower wages for females than for males in regions where more people oppose gender equality 
rights.2  
Although no study has shown whether firms adjust their pay-setting to their local 
discriminatory environment, a number of papers have provided evidence suggesting that 
gender pay gaps persist if firms have monopsony power and if search frictions are larger for 
women than for men (Bhaskar, Manning, and To 2002; Boal and Ransom 1997; Hirsch 2009; 
Hirsch et al. 2010; Manning 2008; Robinson 1969).3  
Moreover, another related strand of the literature focuses on frictions in the product market to 
explain the persistence of discriminatory pay gaps. The main argument of this literature is that 
                                                            
2Rosén (2003) presents a similar model in which prejudiced managers sacrifice their personal 
rents to discriminate against minority workers. Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Lang, Manove, 
and Dickens (2005) show that market frictions can lead to large discriminatory pay gaps, even 
if the market has only few prejudiced employers. 
3 Many of these papers rely on the idea that all firms, not only prejudiced ones, maximize 
profits if they exploit their monopsony power and discriminate against women if markets are 
not perfectly competitive. 
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higher levels of discrimination persist because the lack of product market competition and 
barriers of entry allows more discriminatory employers to continue to operate. A few studies 
have tested this hypothesis. For example, Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) find that 
discrimination against women persists if firms have product market power. In particular, they 
argue that wages should reflect only gender-specific productivity differences in the absence of 
discrimination. Therefore, firms that employ relatively more women should not earn higher 
profits. In contrast, finding evidence that firms with relatively more female employees earn 
higher profits is consistent with gender discrimination. They find that among plants with high 
levels of product market power, those that employ relatively more women are relatively more 
productive. Other related papers find evidence for a negative correlation between product 
market concentration and a firm’s employment of women (e.g., Ashenfelter and Hannan 
1986).  
Customer and coworker discrimination 
Social prejudices towards gender equality may not only produce prejudiced employers or 
managers. Coworkers and customers may also be more prejudiced if social attitudes oppose 
gender equality rights. Thus firms that operate in regions where more people oppose gender 
equality rights may have additional costs, because male workers refuse to work with women 
or because prejudiced customers do not want to buy goods from women. Unlike employer 
discrimination, employee and customer discrimination directly translates into workers’ pay 
and leaves firms’ profitability unaffected, i.e. competitive forces do not eliminate 
discriminatory pay gaps in the long run. In sum, if social attitudes toward gender equality 
stipulate prejudices of coworkers and customers, firms may have larger pay gaps in regions 
where more people have discriminatory social attitudes and oppose gender equality rights4. 
Individual preferences 
Social prejudices may not only produce prejudiced employers, coworkers, or customers; 
social prejudices may also directly influence the preferences and the stereotypical behavior of 
individuals. For example, a number of studies show gender-specific preferences for human 
capital investments and job choices (e.g., Bender, Donohue, and Heywood 2005; Blau and 
Kahn 2000; Blau and Kahn 2006; Brown and Corcoran 1997; Buser, Niederle, and 
                                                            
4 Nonetheless, employers may segregate work teams by gender or, if possible, hire women 
only into occupations with no customer contact, so that coworker and customer discrimination 
does not always result in persisting gender pay gaps (e.g., Altonji and Blank 1999). 
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Oosterbeek 2014; Clark 1997; Donohue and Heywood 2004; Konrad, Ritchie, Lieb, and 
Corrigall 2000; Sloane and Williams 2000). If social attitudes towards gender equality 
amplify the stereotypical behavior of women and men, social attitudes may directly influence 
the labor supply of individual workers (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  
First, fewer women may apply for stereotypically male jobs if more people oppose gender 
equality rights. Second, social attitudes against gender equality may detain women from 
undertaking large human capital investments, an undertaking essential for good performance 
in high-paying jobs. Third, social expectations may influence women’s decision to withdraw 
entirely from the labor market (e.g., Charles, Guryan, and Pan 2009; Fernandez 2011; 
Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Fortin 2005;). Fourth, social attitudes may influence how 
women and men negotiate their salaries (e.g., Barron 2003; Major 1994). 
Thus social attitudes may influence the behavior and relative productivity of women and men 
and, therefore, the way in which women and men sort into jobs, or the way in which firms 
assign women and men to different positions. As for customer and employee discrimination, 
competitive market forces will not eliminate the direct influence of social attitudes towards 
the preferences of women and men. Therefore, firms may have larger pay gaps in regions 
where more people oppose gender equality rights. 
 
II. Estimation strategy 
Our estimations are based on the following regression equation: 𝑙𝑛𝑤!,!(!,!)   =   𝛽!   + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖   + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖    · 𝐴𝑟   + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜂𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖      (1) 
where 𝑗 denotes a firm with more than one local establishment 𝑒 in more than two distinct 
regions 𝑟. All regions are characterized by different levels of social attitudes towards gender 
equality expressed as voter approval rates 𝐴𝑟. 𝜂𝑟 describes regional pay differences affecting 
the pay of all individuals 𝑖 . 𝜃𝑗   is a firm-specific match component. The coefficient 𝛽! 
measures general gender differences in pay, which are equal across all firms and regions. For 
example, 𝛽! may describe general gender-specific productivity differences, or countrywide 
discrimination against women. 𝜀𝑖   is a normally distributed error term. 𝛽! is the effect of main 
interest. Because we include firm fixed-effects, 𝛽!  measures the within-firm correlation 
between voter approval rates and gender pays gaps.  
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If firms with generally larger gender pay gaps cluster mainly around regions where more 
people oppose gender equality rights, or mostly hire high paid men in regions with less 
discriminatory attitudes and low paid women in regions with more discriminatory attitudes, 
the coefficient estimate of 𝛽! in (1) may pick up these sorting effects. To investigate whether 
those types of sorting mechanisms explain the relationship between social attitudes and firms’ 
gender pay gaps, we additionally estimate equation (2), which is essentially equation (1) 
augmented by interaction terms between the gender dummy and firm fixed effects:  
𝑙𝑛𝑤!,!(!,!)   =   𝛽!   + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖    · 𝐴𝑟   + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗𝑓 ∙ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖   + 𝜂𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖5       (2) 
If the described sorting mechanisms were to account for the relationship between social 
attitudes and gender equality rights, we expect a 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝐴𝑟, 𝜃𝑗𝑓 ≠ 0 and coefficient estimates of 
𝛽! to be smaller in (2) than in (1). 
If social attitudes indeed lead women and men to differently invest in human capital or sort in 
different jobs and occupations, observable job and worker characteristics should account for a 
large part of the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps. Therefore, we 
augment equation (1) by different job, and individual worker characteristics.  𝑙𝑛𝑤!,!(!,!)   =   𝛽!   + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖   + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖    · 𝐴𝑟   + 𝐽𝑜𝑏 ∙ 𝛾𝑖,𝑒 𝑗,𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣 ∙ 𝛿𝑖,𝑒(𝑗,𝑟) + 𝜃𝑗   +
𝜂𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖                (3) 
If job and individual characteristics were to account for much of the within-firm relationship 
between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps, we would expect the 
coefficient estimate of 𝛽! to decrease in (3). 
Because we analyze firms with establishments in different regions, our observations are 
grouped in non-nested clusters of firms and regions. If we were not to account for this 
clustering, we might massively underestimate standard errors, and consequently over-reject 
standard hypothesis tests, even if we clustered the standard errors at the regional level. 
Therefore, we follow Cameron and Miller (2010) and estimate standard errors that account for 
non-nested clustering at the firm and the regional levels. To ensure that the covariance matrix 
has full rank, we partial out the control variables. 
                                                            
5 Equation (2) does not contain the isolated gender dummy, as we cannot identify the average 
gender effect if interaction terms between firm fixed effects and the gender dummy are 
present. 
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III. Data 
This section describes our data sets in detail. The first subsection describes the voting data, 
and the second subsection presents our data on the firms. 
 
The voting data 
We measure social attitudes towards gender equality by using voter approval rates across 
different regions, i.e., cantons, in Switzerland. More specifically, we use information on votes 
on two amendments of the Swiss constitution with regard to gender equality. First, we follow 
Lalive and Stutzer (2010) and use voting data on an amendment to the Swiss constitution on 
equal rights for women and men from 1981. However, this vote took place more than 10 years 
before the observation period of our firm data, and even though we expect that social attitudes 
change slowly over time, we cannot be certain that social attitudes do not change over the 
course of more than 20 years. The 1980s in particular was a period of substantial progress 
towards more gender equality in both the labor market and society in general. Such changes 
would be problematic for the interpretation of our results if the relative regional structure of 
social attitudes had changed substantially. For example, regional specific immigration from 
other countries might alter social attitudes towards gender equality in specific regions. 
Therefore, we also use information on regional votes on the 2000 amendment to the Swiss 
constitution on a fair representation of women in the federal government bodies, both legal 
and administrative. To clarify our strategy and provide the necessary background, we now 
present (a) more detailed information on the amendments to the Swiss constitution and (b) 
some descriptive statistics for both votes. 
In 1981, Swiss voters had to decide whether to amend the Swiss constitution to reflect not 
only the equality of human beings in general but the equality of women and men in particular. 
More specifically, the amendment to the Swiss constitution contained the following clauses: 
• “Men and women have equal rights.” 
• “Men and women have equal rights and duties in the family.” 
• “Men and women are entitled to equal pay for equal work.” 
• “Men and women are entitled to equal treatment and equal opportunities in education, 
schooling and vocational education, in employment and occupation.”  
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We argue that the regional voter approval rates provide a measure for identifying social 
attitudes towards gender equality. Although we observe regional variation in social attitudes, 
the Swiss constitution applies to all regions. In other words, cantons whose voters rejected the 
amendment nonetheless have the legal obligation to abide by it. Therefore, the amendment 
has no legal consequences that differ across regions and, therefore, can be considered as an 
appropriate measure for social attitudes. 
We use data on votes from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office on the equal rights amendment 
across the 26 Swiss cantons on June 14, 1981.6 Overall, 60.3% of the voters favored the 
constitutional amendment, and 39.7% rejected it. Table 1 provides the voting results 
separately by canton. 
—Table 1 about here— 
The variation across cantons is substantial. While in Appenzell Inner Rhodes only about 30% 
of the voting population approved the amendment on equal rights, in Geneva more than 80% 
of the voting population approved it. In urban areas such as Zurich, the economic capital of 
Switzerland, only slightly more than 60% approved the amendment. 
As both women and men participated in the voting, the approval rates should represent the 
opinion of both women and men within each region. Although actual voter approval rates for 
women and men are not available, given the anonymity of the ballot box, Table 2 shows the 
results of a post-vote survey on the voting behavior of women and men.7 
The survey is provided by the Swiss Foundation for Research and Social Sciences and stems 
from a project called VoxIt, which has conducted post-voting surveys during the two or three 
weeks following all federal elections since 1977. The project infers information about Swiss 
voter behavior and political and social affinities. Although even the survey data for the 
question on gender equality is not representative and is available for only some cantons, the 
results show a pattern very similar to the actual voting presented in Table 1. 
—Table 2 about here— 
For example, in the real vote on the amendment, the cantonal approval rate was highest in 
                                                            
6  The information is available from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office under http://www.bfs.admin. 
ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/data/05/01.html. 
7  For more information on the post-vote survey, see http://forsdata.unil.ch/projects/Voxit/ 
docu_xl_htmD/ListeVoxDispoD.htm?lang=e&menu=4. 
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Geneva at 85.2%, and the VoxIt data also shows Geneva with the highest approval rate, at 
88.6%. St. Gallen and Aargau show low approval rates of 46.3% and 52.1%, respectively, in 
the real vote and relatively low approval rates of 63.4% and 68.4% in the VoxIt survey. As 
overall approval rates are almost always higher in the post-vote survey than in the real voting 
outcomes, the data supports survey data is being subject to a desirability bias. Nevertheless, 
the relative outcomes of both data sets are surprisingly similar. 
An important outcome of the post-vote survey is that women’s votes quite strongly match 
men’s votes. Women have the lowest approval rates in St. Gallen and Aargau, whereas they 
have the highest approval rates in Geneva and Zurich. Therefore, the post-vote survey 
provides some additional indication that the votes proxy social attitudes that manifest in both 
women’s and men’s preferences in a particular region. 
For our second measure for social attitudes, we use information on regional votes on the 2000 
amendment to the Swiss constitution on a fair representation of women in all official federal 
bodies. The amendment stated that women should be fairly represented in all federal bodies, 
both legal (e.g., the parliament, the federal council and the federal court) and administrative 
(e.g., the federal administration, state owned and operated enterprises, and universities). As 
with the information for the vote on gender equality in the labor market, the data for the votes 
about the fair representation amendment comes from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.8 
Although the two amendments differ in content, both cover an issue related to social attitudes 
towards gender equality. Specifically, we plausibly assume that the population’s general 
feeling about gender equality affects both amendments in similar ways. Even if the absolute 
voting outcomes might not be comparable across the two amendments, the information 
nevertheless helps us clearly identify whether relative differences in social attitudes towards 
gender equality determine differences in the gender pay gap across regions. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the voting outcome. In contrast to the amendment on 
gender equality, most Swiss voters (82.0% ) rejected the amendment on the fair representation 
of women in the federal government. Nevertheless, the patterns across regions are very 
similar to those for the 1981 amendment. Therefore, the results indicate that the relative 
structure of social attitudes has not changed across cantons over time. 
—Table 3 about here— 
                                                            
8  The information is available from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office at http://www.bfs.admin. 
ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/data/07/01.html. 
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Table 3 reveals that the relative pattern for the 2000 amendment is astonishingly similar to 
that of the 1981 amendment (table 1). For example, Geneva has the highest approval rate for 
both amendments, whereas Appenzell Inner Rodes has the lowest. To clarify this relationship, 
Figure 1 compares the voting results for both amendments. The graph shows a strong positive 
relationship between both amendments, with a correlation between both variables of 87.11%. 
Thus the results strongly suggest that the relative structure of social attitudes did not change 
substantially over more than two decades. 
The firm data 
Our firm data stems from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (ESS), a survey covering a 
large number of firms. The ESS is based on two-level sampling (i.e., both firms and workers) 
and selects the firms from the Swiss "business and enterprise" register. This data is 
representative of all economic sectors except agriculture. The survey does not cover firms 
with fewer than 3 employees, nor does it provide information on trainees, apprentices, or 
workers who are paid only on commissions. Firms with fewer than 20 employees are required 
to report all employees. Firms with 20 and 50 employees are allowed to report only every 
second employee, and firms with more than 50 employees are allowed to report every third 
employee. However, the firms are required to select their reported workers randomly. The 
ESS has been conducted in biennially repeated cross-sections since 1994, and participation 
for firms is compulsory. 
To identify multiple establishments of firms across cantons, we need information on workers’ 
administrative cantonal districts. As the EES provides such information only for 1994 through 
1998, we restrict our sample to that period. Unfortunately, the data only allows us to identify 
different establishments if they are located in different cantonal regions. Multiple 
establishments located in the same region appear in the data source as a single establishment. 
This restriction, however, is not decisive for the main focus of our analysis, i.e., to analyze the 
relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and firms’ pay-setting behavior. 
At the firm level, we restrict our sample to companies in the private sector with 
establishments in more than one canton. To ensure that we can measure a gender pay gap 
within each establishment, we require that every establishment in our sample contains 
information about at least two employees and at least one woman and one man. Additionally, 
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we exclude all agricultural firms because the observations in our data are not representative 
for this sector. Moreover, some firms report different industry categorizations for 
establishments in different regions. We drop those firms from the sample. Given these 
restrictions, we have to drop the small canton Appenzell Inner Rhodes from our sample, as 
none of the establishments there match our restrictions. 
At the employee level, we restrict the sample to full-time workers (i.e., workers with more 
than 30 working hours per week) who were older than 16 when they entered the firm and 
younger than 65 at the time of the survey. We only incorporate full-time workers in our 
analysis because part-time workers are likely to differ from full-time workers in terms of their 
unobserved productivity. Part-time working women in particular are likely to follow a very 
different career path than full-time working men. We are aware that this restriction is 
somewhat strong and that it excludes more women from our sample than men. However, our 
results do not change even when we use the entire sample of workers; indeed, the magnitude 
of the coefficient estimates becomes even bigger. Nevertheless, as we do not want to capture 
a part-time effect in our results, we present only the results for the restricted sample of full-
time workers in this paper. Results for the unrestricted sample are available upon request. 
Table 4 shows an overview of the observations of the restricted sample. 
—Table 4 about here— 
The restriction to employees without missing information for the included variables leaves us 
with 332,087 employees, of whom 109,058 are women and 223,029 are men. In total, we 
observe 1277 firms with 4457 establishments. Most firms in our sample have about four 
establishments in different cantons, with a maximum of 25—i.e., some firms have 
establishments in every canton included in our sample. 
We use the following variables in our investigation: Workers’ pay is measured as the 
standardized sum of gross monthly wages. This pay measure includes an employee’s 
contribution to social insurance, payment in kind, regularly paid-out participation in sales and 
bonuses, and compensation for shift- and night-work. In addition, thirteen months of 
payments or yearly special payments are included pro rata. Although inflation in Switzerland 
is not high, we adjust wages according to the National Consumer Price Index. We obtain the 
workers’ education in categories and convert them in years of education according to Wirz 
(2008). We have a measure for workers’ years of tenure and weekly working hours. We know 
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whether workers are covered by a union contract and whether they are married. We can 
observe the workers’ occupation in twenty-four categories and create five dummies for the 
workers’ job position, ranging from no-management to upper management. 
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 5 for all workers and for women and men separately. 
About 30% of our sample is female. Average weekly working hours are around 40. Men earn 
about 0.30 log points more than females. Men also have slightly more education, and their 
average tenure is about 3 years higher than that of women. While we find no large difference 
in the weekly working hours of men and women, men are substantially more often married 
and are more likely to hold a management position. This difference is most striking in top and 
upper management. 
—Table 5 about here— 
 
IV. Results 
In the first subsection, before we turn to our main analysis investigating the relationship 
between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps, we analyze whether social attitudes 
towards gender equality influence how women and men sort into different firms or whether 
firms hire and assign women and men to different jobs within firms.  
In the second subsection, we present our main estimates for the within-firm relationship 
between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps. Although we cannot present causal 
evidence for the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps, this 
subsection carefully discusses various mechanisms for explaining the relationship and 
presents evidence for different subsamples and industries. The third subsection shows 
estimates of the same type for a subsample of workers for whom we are able to observe their 
time-based and their performance pay component.  
The effect of social attitudes towards job and firm segregation 
Table 6 describes the results for the relationship between social attitudes and gender-specific 
firm segregation. The first column of Table 6 presents an OLS regression of voter approval 
rates on the share of women per establishment. Because all observations are grouped at the 
firm and regional level, estimated standard errors account for non-nested clustering. The 
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results show a positive significant coefficient estimate, indicating that the average share of 
women per establishment increases in voter approval rates. Specifically, a 10 percentage point 
increase in voter approval rates is associated with a 1.8 percentage point increase in the share 
of women per establishment. Given that the average share of women per establishment is 
about 32 percent, this effect is substantial. The result is in line with Becker’s model and other 
studies showing that social attitudes influence women’s labor force participation. 
— Table 6 about here — 
After we account for firm-fixed effects in the second specification of Table 6, the point 
estimate decreases substantially and the effect turns insignificant. Thus the results suggest that 
regional social attitudes towards gender equality influence how women and men sort between 
but not within firms.  
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 present similar OLS regressions of voter approval 
rates on the Duncan index on the establishment level. The Duncan index, a common measure 
for occupational segregation, can be interpreted as the percentage of women who would have 
to change occupations to achieve an occupational distribution similar to men. On average 
about 40 percent of women within the average establishment had to change occupation to 
achieve a distribution similar to men. Column three shows a negative coefficient estimate of 
voter approval rates, indicating that establishments are more segregated in socially more 
prejudiced regions. Although the point estimate is not particularly small, the effect is not 
significant. If we account for firm fixed effects, the point estimate decreases substantially. In 
summary, the results suggest that regional social attitudes towards gender equality influence 
how women and men sort between but not within firms. 
Table 7 investigates the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and 
different individual outcome variables. The estimates stem from regressions of a female 
dummy, a continuous measure for voter approval rates, and an interaction term between both 
variables. All regressions contain region and firm fixed effects. Standard errors account for 
non-nested clustering.  
The first column presents estimates from a regression on years of education. The second 
column presents a linear probability model, where the dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating whether an individual holds a management position or not. The third column 
describes a specification where the dependent variable is a measure for the average log pay 
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within each occupation, for inferring whether women and men select into jobs with different 
pay levels. The fourth column shows the relationship between voter approval rates and the 
gender-specific probability of receiving performance pay.  
As none of the interaction terms between voter approval rates and the gender dummy is 
significant, the results do not indicate that social attitudes have a strong influence on how 
firms assign women and men to different jobs within firms. 
— Table 7 about here — 
 
The effect of social attitudes towards gender pay gaps 
Figure 2 graphically shows a regression of regional firm-internal gender pay gaps and the 
average regional approval rates in Switzerland. Specifically, the results in the figure stem 
from the following two-step procedure: First, using all observation, we predict gender pay 
gaps for each canton. As our interest lies in investigating the differences in gender pay gaps 
within firms, we account for firm fixed effects in the first stage. Second, we regress these 
predicted pay gaps on the regional shares of voter approval rates by collapsing the data to the 
25 observations at the cantonal level. To take into account that the gender pay gaps are 
estimated with varying precision, we weight each of the 25 observations by the inverse of the 
coefficient variance of the first-stage regression. 
— Figure 2 about here — 
The figure suggests that the average gender pay gap is smaller in establishments in regions 
where more voters approved the equality rights amendment than in regions where fewer 
voters approved the equality rights amendment. More specifically, the gender pay gap is on 
average about 0.10 log points smaller in establishments in regions where about 80% of voters 
approved the equal rights amendment than in establishments located in regions where only 
about 40% did. The R-squared of this regression amounts to 0.449, indicating that more than 
half of the variation of gender pay gaps can be attributed to changes in voter approval rates. 
However, the previous procedure does not display the within-firm effect of voter approval 
rates on gender pay gaps. Therefore, in the following analysis, we show the results of various 
specifications of equation (1) for the entire sample of observed workers. Table 8 presents the 
estimation results. The table shows six different specifications including different sets of 
 17 
 
control variables. 
 
— Table 8 about here — 
The first column of Table 8 shows the results for specification (1), which does not include any 
control variables. The first row of the first column shows a within-firm gender pay gap of 
about 44 percentage points for an establishment in a hypothetical region where nobody 
approved the equality rights amendment. The second row displays the effect of main interest. 
The point estimate of the interaction term between voter approval rates and the indicator for 
females is 0.223. This value indicates that every 10 percentage-point difference in voter 
approval rate is associated with a 2.2 percentage-point decrease in the within-firm gender pay 
gap. For example, the cities of Lucerne and Basel-Stadt are of similar size and have a similar 
urban structure. The within-firm average gender pay gap is about 32 percentage points in an 
establishment in Lucerne, where about 50% of the voters approved the amendment. Yet the 
pay gap is only 28 percentage points in Basel-Stadt where about 72% of the voters approved 
it. Thus in our example the gender pay gap decreases by 4.8 percentage points and is therefore 
about 12% smaller in Basel-Stadt than in Lucerne. 
As mentioned in the data section, the amendment for gender-specific equality rights took 
place in 1981—more than 10 years before our observation period. Therefore, in the second 
specification we replace the voting data on the 1981 amendment with voting data from the 
2000 amendment for a fair representation of women in federal governmental bodies. The 
second column of Table 8 shows the results. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term 
between the approval rates of the 2000 amendment and the gender dummy is positive and 
highly significant. Specifically, a 10 percentage-point increase in voter approval rates is 
associated with a 3.8 percentage point decrease in the within-firm gender pay gap. The results 
of the 2000 amendment vote conclusively confirm our results for the 1981 amendment.  
If firms with generally larger pay gaps sort into regions where more people oppose gender 
equality rights, and firms with smaller pay gaps sort into regions where fewer people oppose 
gender equality rights, our coefficient of main interest would pick up this firm sorting effect. 
Moreover, if firms generally hire many low-paid women in regions where more people 
oppose gender equality rights, our coefficient would also pick up this sorting effect. The third 
column of Table 8 shows the results of regression equation (2), which includes interaction 
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terms between the gender dummy and firm fixed effects. The coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term between the female dummy and voter approval rates does not change 
substantially. Nonetheless, the standard error in third specification is almost twice the size of 
the standard error in the first specification, because we added 1276 dummy variables.  
The other potential explanation for finding a connection between social attitudes and firms’ 
gender pay gaps is regional differences of women’s labor supply or human capital investment. 
Therefore, the remaining three specifications stem from regression equation (3) and 
successively add further control variables to the regression. The fourth column of Table 8 
shows that the inclusion of occupational dummies only modestly reduces the coefficient 
estimates of both variables. Therefore, occupational segregation appears not to be the major 
mechanism by which social attitudes influence the pay-setting behavior of firms.  
The fifth specification examines how worker’s job positions mitigate the relationship between 
voter approval rates and gender pay differentials. The job position is measured in five 
categories ranging from no management position to high and upper management position. 
The fifth column of Table 8 presents the results. After the inclusion of the dummies for the 
worker’s job position, the magnitude of the average isolated gender pay gap decreases to 
about 36%. In contrast, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between approval rates 
and the gender dummy increases slightly and now amounts to 0.257. 
The sixth specification investigates to what extent observable individual worker 
characteristics mitigate the relationship between regional approval rates and firm-internal pay 
gaps. Therefore, we add variables for tenure, tenure squared, entry age, entry age squared, 
union, marital status, and years of education to the regression equation. To account for the 
gender specific effects of the workers’ entry age on wages, we also interact the entry age 
variable with the gender dummy. The sixth column of Table 8 presents the results.  
We find substantial effects of observable worker characteristics on the isolated gender pay 
gap, i.e., the coefficient of the female dummy indicating the isolated gender pay gap drops by 
about 0.12 log points, from 0.360 to about 0.235. The coefficient estimate of the interaction 
term between voter approval rates and the gender dummy also drops from about 0.257 log 
points to about 0.181. As particularly observable worker characteristics appear to mitigate the 
within-firm relationship between voter approval rate and gender pay gaps, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that regional social attitudes towards gender equality are related to unobserved 
regional gender-specific productivity differences, which persist even for women and men who 
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work in the same jobs and firms. 
Nonetheless, even if we account for observable productivity related worker characteristics, 
the connection between firms’ gender pay gaps and regional variation in voter approval rates 
remains relatively large and robust. Therefore, we cannot reject the possibility that regional 
differences in pay discrimination constitute the relationship between voter approval rates and 
the gender pay gap. On the one hand, local employers or managers may be more 
discriminatory in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights. On the other 
hand, more prejudiced customers and coworkers may populate more prejudiced regions and 
lead firms to adjust women’s wages downward.  
Some industries are characterized by strong product market concentration, while other 
industries require workers to have close customer contact. Therefore, analyzing the 
relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps by different 
industry categories may shed some light on mechanism behind this relationship. Table 9 
presents the estimates by industry categories. The table shows the within-firm estimates of 
equation (1) for the following broad industry categories: manufacturing, commerce (including 
wholesale and retail), credit and banking, and a remainder category ("other"), containing firms 
in all remaining (smaller) industries in our sample. To test whether the effects differ by 
industry, we used third-order interaction terms between the industry dummy, the gender pay 
gap, and voter approval rates and the corresponding second-order interaction between all 
relevant variables.  
— Table 9 about here — 
We find the largest point estimate for the manufacturing sector (0.339 log points), directly 
followed by the commerce sector (0.213 log points). Although the two coefficient estimates 
are not significantly different from one another, they are both significantly larger than the 
point estimates for the banking sector (0.160 log points) and the remainder industries (0.046 
log points).  
The manufacturing sector in Switzerland is characterized by high market concentration, 
suggesting that firms in that sector have high product market power. Rutz (2013) indeed 
calculates Herfindal-Hirschman indices (HHI) of up to 720 for some manufacturing 
industries. In contrast, the HHI for the wholesale and commerce sectors only amounts to 114, 
and the credit sector has a HHI of 94. Moreover, capital intensities are substantially larger in 
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the manufacturing sector than in all other sectors of Swiss industry, suggesting high barriers 
to entry for the manufacturing sector. Therefore, the results are consistent with the results of 
Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (2002), who find stronger gender discrimination for firms 
with product market power.  
Time-based vs. performance pay 
In this subsection, we analyze a subsample of workers whose pay consists of a performance 
pay and a time-based pay component, because social attitudes towards gender equality could 
have different effects on workers’ performance pay component than on their time-based pay 
component. We now discuss the four most important reasons for such differences. The first 
two theories suggest more discrimination in the performance pay than in the time-based pay 
component. The last two theories suggest less discrimination in the performance than in the 
time-based pay component.  
First, if performance pay components are tied to workers’ productivity according to objective 
quantity measures and fixed rules, differences in performance pay components must reflect 
productivity differences. Consequently, managers face more difficulties in discriminating 
against women in the performance pay component than in the time-based component. Indeed, 
several empirical studies show that the wages of performance pay workers are more closely 
related to their observed and unobserved productivity than are the wages of workers under 
time-based pay (e.g., Lazear 2000; Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 2009).  
Second, gender-specific differences in salary negotiations may result in a different effect for 
performance and time-based pay. A number of studies show that women perform worse in 
salary negotiations than men. If social attitudes towards gender equality amplify the gender-
specific bargaining behavior, gender pay gaps may be larger under time-based pay than under 
performance pay, even if managers do not discriminate against women.  
Third, if performance pay is based on the subjective evaluation of discriminatory managers, 
managers may even discriminate more under performance pay than under time-based pay.  
Fourth, if performance pay is based on sales commission and customer discrimination 
matters, the relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps could also be stronger 
in the performance component than in time-based component.  
We therefore analyze a subsample of workers for whom we are able to observe a time-based 
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pay component, which is based only on the contractual working hours, and a performance pay 
component, which includes bonus payments, gratification, and profit sharing. Unfortunately, 
for workers who are regularly paid by commission and piece rates, we are not able to 
distinguish the workers’ performance pay component from the workers’ time-based pay 
component. After we remove those workers from the sample of performance pay workers, 
88,742 individual workers remain (table 10). 
— Table 10 about here — 
Thirty percent of the restricted sample of performance pay workers is female. Thus the 
distribution of women and men appears similar to that in the entire sample of workers. The 
time-based component of workers with performance pay is on average about 0.10 log points 
higher than the wages for the entire sample of the workers. This result holds for both women 
and men. The raw gender pay gap in time-based pay is about 0.25 log points and 0.35 log 
points for the performance pay component.   
Tables 11 and 12 present the results. Table 11 shows the results for the time-based pay  
component. Table 12 shows the results for the performance pay component for those same 
workers. 
— Table 11 about here — 
— Table 12 about here — 
The first specification of Table 11 shows the results without further control variables. The 
results show an isolated gender pay gap for the time-based pay component of about 0.394 log 
points. This value is very similar to the estimates from the entire sample in Table 8. 
The result of main interest—the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the 
female dummy and the voter approval rate—shows a positive significant estimate for the 
time-based pay component. The effect is with 0.174 log points slightly smaller than the effect 
for the entire sample (table 8). One possible explanation is that women working under 
performance pay are more competitive or more focused on their career, so that the gender pay 
gap is somewhat smaller for performance pay workers—even in the time-based pay 
component. 
The first specification of Table 12 shows the same results for the performance pay component 
of those same workers. In contrast to the previous results for the time-based pay component, 
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we do not find a significant effect of the interaction term on the performance pay component. 
Specification II of Tables 11 and 12 replaces the voting data on the 1981 amendment with the 
voting data of the 2000 amendment. The results are qualitatively similar to those in 
specification I Specification III incorporates all controls for observable job and worker 
characteristics, and shows a substantial reduction of the isolated gender pay gap for both the 
workers’ performance pay and time-based pay component. In contrast, the coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term between the female dummy and the regional approval rate 
decreases only slightly for the time-based pay component, whereas the same interaction term 
remains insignificant for the performance pay component. 
As previously argued, the nature of performance pay may differ strongly according to 
workers’ jobs and sectors, e.g., workers may receive high subjective bonus payments in the 
banking sector, sales bonuses in commerce, or bonus payments for reaching productivity 
targets in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, Tables 13 and 14 present separate estimates for 
the four broad industry categories (manufacturing, commerce, credit, and others) for the 
workers’ time-based pay component and performance pay component. 
— Table 13 about here — 
— Table 14 about here — 
Table 13 shows the results for the time-based pay component. The point estimates for the 
manufacturing and commerce sector are large and significantly different from zero and also 
significantly different from the coefficient estimate of the remainder industries. The point 
estimate for banking and the remaining category for all other industries are small and not 
significantly different from zero.  
Table 14 shows the results for performance pay. The most striking finding is the positive 
significant point estimate for the commerce sector. The payment of commerce workers may 
be more strongly related to their customer contact than in other sectors. In particular, if 
commerce workers are more likely to receive sales bonuses than other workers, the strong 
relationship between voter approval rates and the gender pay gap in the performance pay 
component may indicate that regional differences in customer discrimination drive the 
relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps in this sector.  
The results of Tables 13 and 14 support our assumption that social attitudes may have 
different effects on workers’ time-based and performance pay components. For example, 
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managers may face more difficulties in discriminating against female manufacturing workers 
in their performance pay, because manufacturing workers produce output, which can be easily 
quantified. In contrast, in commerce it may be the customers who—because of their 
discriminatory social attitudes—want to discriminate against female workers, in which case 
the females’ performance pay component could be strongly related to social attitudes towards 
gender equality.  
 
V. Discussion and conclusion 
We combine information on regional variation in social attitudes towards gender equality with 
a large data set of multi-establishment firms and workers to analyze the relationship between 
these social attitudes and firms’ gender pay gaps. Therefore, we are able to observe the same 
firms under the influences of regional differences in social attitudes towards gender equality. 
Even after we account for unobserved firm heterogeneity, we find a strong relationship 
between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps. In other words, the 
relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps remains, 
even after we take into account the possibility that social attitudes may lead women and men 
to segregate into entirely different firms. Thus the results show that firms pay more 
discriminatory wages in regions where more people have discriminatory social attitudes.  
Our results are consistent with different theories on the relationship between social attitudes 
towards gender equality and gender pay gaps. First, discriminatory social attitudes could 
shape the self-image of women and men towards a more stereotypical role model, with men 
being the breadwinner and women being responsible for the household, so that discriminatory 
social attitudes lead women to sort into entirely different jobs, invest less in education, or 
exert less effort on the job, even if working in the same jobs and firms as men. Consequently, 
regional gender-specific productivity differences would then account for large shares of the 
relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps. However, 
if regional-specific productivity differences alone accounted for the relationship between 
social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps, supply side variables and 
workers characteristics should mitigate the relationship in a substantial way. But the results 
remain robust if we account for detailed worker and job characteristics, and we find no 
evidence that social attitudes towards gender equality influence how firms assign women and 
men to different jobs and occupations across regions.  
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Second, discriminatory social attitudes could lead prejudiced employers with a taste for 
discrimination to offer different employment options to women than to men, i.e., women 
receive fewer and worse job opportunities than men and have more difficulties finding equal 
employment under discriminatory social attitudes. If market frictions exist, all firms, both 
prejudiced and non-prejudiced, could then benefit by not raising women’s wages to their 
marginal productivity (e.g., Black 1995; Lang and Lehmann 2012; Lang, Manove, and 
Dickens 2005; Rosén 1997; Rosén 2003; Sasaki 1999). Consequently, all firms have 
incentives to pay lower wages to women in regions where more people oppose gender 
equality rights than in regions where fewer people do. As we find a strong correlation of a 
within-firm gender wage gap with the discriminatory attitudes in the region in which each 
establishment is located, our results are consistent with the theory of employer discrimination 
in non-competitive markets. This is particularly so because the strongest relationship between 
social attitudes and gender pay gaps lies in the manufacturing sector, for which product 
market concentration and barriers to entry are the highest in Switzerland.  
Third, our results are also consistent with the idea of coworker and customer discrimination, 
because coworkers and customers may be more prejudiced in regions where more people 
oppose gender equality rights enough so that firms have larger pay gaps in those regions. As 
we find the strongest relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps in the 
performance pay of commerce workers, who have a lot of customer interaction, we conclude 
that customers' discriminatory attitudes may be particularly important for workers in the 
commerce sector.  
However, a limitation of our study is that in the end we cannot fully distinguish among the 
different theories that we discussed. To do so, we would need more detailed information on 
the actual behavior and decision-making of employers and customers but, unfortunately, such 
data is not available. This limitation notwithstanding, our paper provides an important new 
insight into understanding the role of firms in the relationship between social attitudes and 
gender pay gaps.  
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VI. Tables and figures in the text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between Approval Rates 
Notes: The voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Figure 2. Monthly Wages and Approval Rates.  
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn form the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998.  
The voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Table 1. Regional Voter Approval Rates: Equality Rights 
 
           
  Region Total votes In favor Approval rate   
      
 Appenzell Inner Rhodes 2529 805 31.8%  
 Schwyz 20075 7594 37.8%  
 Glarus 8014 3362 42.0%  
 Appenzell Outer Rhodes 11244 4743 42.2%  
 Uri 8265 3616 43.8%  
 Valais 33084 15237 46.1%  
 St. Gallen 73620 34073 46.3%  
 Thurgau 40270 19469 48.3%  
 Nidwalden 7141 3508 49.1%  
 Lucerne 67982 34313 50.5%  
 Aargau 85950 44782 52.1%  
 Obwalden 5362 2818 52.6%  
 Graubünden 30054 16830 56.0%  
 Solothurn 88576 51029 57.6%  
 Zug 20554 11925 58.0%  
 Schaffhausen 28591 16673 58.3%  
 Bern 177168 108695 61.4%  
 Zurich 266619 168099 63.0%  
 Fribourg 28936 18674 64.5%  
 Neuchâtel 30399 20095 66.1%  
 Ticino 42915 28438 66.3%  
 Basel-Landschaft 44530 30540 68.6%  
 Vaud 78446 54073 68.9%  
 Basel-Stadt 44687 32354 72.4%  
 Jura 11040 8450 76.5%  
  Geneva 67536 57507 85.2%   
Notes: The voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Table 2. Regional Voter Approval Rates by Gender 
 
                  
  All Men Women  
  Region Total votes Approval Total vote Approval Total vote Approval   
         
 St. Gallen 101 63.4 48 56.3 53 69.8  
 Aargau 69 68.1 36 66.7 33 69.7  
 Bern 195 74.9 97 66.0 98 83.7  
 Basel-Landschaft 38 81.6 20 90.0 18 72.2  
 Zurich 204 82.8 109 79.8 95 86.3  
 Vaud 122 85.2 57 80.7 65 89.2  
 Basel-Stadt 54 87.0 27 77.8 27 96.3  
 Geneva 44 88.6 20 95.0 24 83.3  
                  
Notes: The voting data stem from the VoxIt. 
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Table 3. Regional Voter Approval Rates: Federal Representation 
 
            
  Region Total votes In favor Approval rate   
      
 Appenzell Inner Rhodes 4283 302 7.1%  
 Schwyz 41805 4719 11.3%  
 Glarus 9653 1305 13.5%  
 Appenzell Outer Rhodes 17760 2273 12.8%  
 Uri 12827 1670 13.0%  
 Valais 60886 9405 15.5%  
 St. Gallen 121818 16859 13.8%  
 Thurgau 57124 7767 13.6%  
 Nidwalden 11662 1251 10.7%  
 Lucerne 106603 16694 15.7%  
 Aargau 140426 18842 13.4%  
 Obwalden 9538 1134 11.9%  
 Graubünden 44773 6945 15.5%  
 Solothurn 73716 10672 14.5%  
 Zug 29870 4403 14.7%  
 Schaffhausen 29836 6215 20.8%  
 Bern 288654 47248 16.4%  
 Zürich 339631 66411 19.6%  
 Fribourg 62694 11298 18.0%  
 Neuchâtel 36226 9088 25.1%  
 Ticino 56591 10453 18.5%  
 Basel-Landschaft 73146 12214 16.7%  
 Vaud 124920 29548 23.7%  
 Basel-Stadt 60232 15853 26.3%  
 Jura 18070 4174 23.1%  
  Geneva 94429 29571 31.3%   
      
Notes: The voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Table 4. Observations 
 
            
 Individual     
      
 Total   332087  
 Women   109058  
 Men   223029  
      
 Firm     
      
 Firms   1277  
 Establishments   4457  
      
 Establishments per firm     
      
 Median   4  
 Min   2  
 Max   25  
            
 Notes: The voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics: Entire Sample of Workers 
 
              
  Variable   All Female Male   
       
 Log gross monthly wage  8.634 8.409 8.745  
   (0.38) (0.313) (0.361)  
       
 Female (Dummy)  0.328 1.000 0.000  
   (0.47) (0.000) (0.000)  
       
 Firm entry age  29.841 29.557 29.979  
   (8.502) (8.917) (8.285)  
       
 Education in years  12.351 11.515 12.759  
   (2.276) (1.927) (2.321)  
       
 Tenure  10.771 8.654 11.806  
   (9.053) (7.447) (9.574)  
       
 Union (Dummy)  0.253 0.243 0.259  
   (0.435) (0.429) (0.438)  
       
 Married (Dummy)  0.597 0.417 0.686  
   (0.491) (0.493) (0.464)  
       
 Weekly working hours  40.734 40.097 41.045  
   (2.065) (2.952) (1.34)  
       
 No management position  0.655 0.764 0.602  
   (0.475) (0.425) (0.49)  
       
 Lowest management  0.126 0.133 0.122  
   (0.332) (0.339) (0.328)  
       
 Lower management  0.134 0.078 0.162  
   (0.341) (0.269) (0.368)  
       
 Middle management  0.067 0.022 0.089  
   (0.25) (0.146) (0.285)  
       
 Top and upper management  0.018 0.003 0.025  
   (0.131) (0.054) (0.155)  
              
 Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 6. Social Attitudes and Gender-Specific Firm Segregation 
 
              
  Share Female: Duncan index:  
    I II I II   
       
 Average 0.328 0.422  
  (0.172) (0.224)  
       
              
 Approval Rate: 0.184** -0.018 -0.091 -0.016  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.077) (0.074) (0.087) (0.050)  
       
 Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes  
 Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes  
    332087 332087 332087 332087   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7. Social Attitudes and Gender-Specific Job Segregation 
 
              
  Education: Management (1/0): Average log pay 
in occupation: 
Performance pay 
(1/0): 
 
   
              
       
 Female -1.385*** -0.177*** -0.075** -0.0188  
  (0.252) (0.028) (0.030) (0.035)  
        
 Approval Rate: 0.312 -0.019 0.039 -0.054  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.380) (0.048) (0.051) (0.053)  
       
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
  Observations: 332087 332087 332087 332087   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8. Wage Regression (Monthly Wages of the Entire Sample) 
 
  Dependent variable:  log(monthly income) 
  Specifications: I II III IV V VI 
        
 Female -0.437*** -0.372*** - -0.418*** -0.359*** -0.235*** 
  (0.020) (0.011)  (0.013) (0.024) (0.032) 
 Female* Approval Rate:  0.223*** - 0.216***  0.208***  0.257***  0.181*** 
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.033)  (0.052) (0.017) (0.028) (0.031) 
        
 Female* Approval Rate: - 0.379*** - - - - 
 Representation (2000)  (0.053)     
        
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Occupation No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 Job position No No No No Yes Yes 
 
Prod. relevant 
characteristics 
No No 
No No No Yes 
 
Female*Firm Fixed 
effects No No Yes No No No 
  Observations: 332087 332087 332087 332087 332087 332087 
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The 
voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The dependent variable is monthly time- based 
wage for all workers. The control variables include tenure, tenure squared, firm entry age, entry age squared, 
education union status, marital status, job position and occupation. Non-nested standard errors are calculated 
at the region and firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at 
the 1% level. 
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Table 9. Wage regression by industry categories 
 
 Dependent variable: log (monthly income) 
 Industry categories: Manufacturing Commerce Banking Other  
              
 Approval Rate: 0.339***♭♯ 0.213***♭♯ 0.160***♯ 0.046  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.094) (0.062) (0.037) (0.063)  
       
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
    332087 332087 332087 332087   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
♮Significantly different from “commerce” at 5% level; ♭ Significantly different from “banking” at the 5% level; 
♯ Significantly different from “other” at the 5% level.  
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Table 10. Summary Statistics: Performance Pay Workers 
 
              
  Variable   All Female Male   
       
 Log performance comp.  5.471 5.298 5.549  
   (1.240) (1.115) (1.282)  
       
 Log time-based comp.  8.758 8.508 8.863  
   (0.404) (0.343) (0.381)  
       
 Female (Dummy)  0.297 1.000 0.000  
   (0.457) (0.000) (0.000)  
       
 Firm entry age  29.783 29.203 29.310  
   (8.05) (8.622) (7.796)  
       
 Education in years  12.692 11.740 13.093  
   (2.418) (2.178) (2.402)  
       
 Tenure  11.776 9.459 12.753  
   (8.846) (7.446) (9.337)  
       
 Union (Dummy)  0.195 0.203 0.192  
   (0.396) (0.402) (0.394)  
       
 Married (Dummy)  0.627 0.427 0.711  
   (0.484) (0.495) (0.453)  
       
 Weekly working hours  40.779 40.124 41.057  
   (1.976) (2.957) (1.268)  
       
 No management position  0.548 0.688 0.489  
   (0.498) (0.463) (0.500)  
       
 Lowest management  0.143 0.164 0.133  
   (0.350) (0.37) (0.340)  
       
 Lower management  0.198 0.116 0.233  
   (0.399) (0.319) (0.423)  
       
 Middle management  0.092 0.030 0.118  
   (0.289) (0.171) (0.323)  
       
 Top and upper management  0.019 0.002 0.026  
   (0.137) (0.047) (0.160)  
              
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 11. Wage Regression III: Time-Based Pay Component 
 
              
    I 
Base 
II 
Representation 
III 
Controls: 
Labor Market 
IV 
Controls: 
Performance Pay 
  
       
 Female -0.394*** -0.342*** -0.223*** -0.178***  
  (0.029) (0.021) (0.042) (0.049)  
       
 Female* Approval Rate: 0.174*** - 0.127** 0.172***  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.047)  (0.058) (0.035)  
       
 Female* Approval Rate: - 0.290*** - -  
 Representation (2000)  (0.098)    
       
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Occupation No No Yes Yes  
 Job position No No Yes Yes  
 
Prod. relevant 
characteristics 
No No Yes Yes 
 
  Observations: 88742 88742 88742 88742   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The dependent variable is monthly time- based wage for all 
workers. The control variables include tenure, tenure squared, firm entry age, entry age squared, education union 
status, marital status, job position and occupation. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 12. Wage Regression III: Performance Pay Component 
 
            
    I 
Base 
II 
Representation 
III 
Controls: 
Labor Market 
  
      
 Female -0.478*** -0.434*** -0.321*  
  (0.159) (0.096) (0.173)  
      
 Female* Approval Rate: 0.088 - 0.026  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.238)  (0.225)  
      
 Female* Approval Rate: - 0.061 -  
 Representation (2000)  (0.397)   
      
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
 Occupation No No Yes  
 Job position No No Yes  
 
Prod. relevant 
characteristics 
No No Yes 
 
  Observations: 88742 88742 88742   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The dependent variable is monthly time- based wage for all 
workers. The control variables include tenure, tenure squared, firm entry age, entry age squared, education union 
status, marital status, job position and occupation. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 13. Time-based pay component by industry categories 
 
 Dependent variable: log (time based pay component) 
 Industry categories: Manufacturing Commerce Banking Other  
              
 Approval Rate: 0.208*** ♯ 0.309*** ♯♭ 0.074 0.137  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.046) (0.101) (0.037) (0.139)  
       
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
    332087 332087 332087 332087   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
♮Significantly different from “commerce” at the 5% level; ♭ Significantly different from “banking” at the 5% 
level; ♯ Significantly different from “other” at the 5% level.  
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Table 14. Performance pay component by industry categories 
 
 Dependent variable: log (performance pay component) 
 Industry categories: Manufacturing Commerce Banking Other  
              
 Approval Rate: -0.008 0.630**♯ 0.066 0.090  
 Equal Rights (1981) (0.464) (0.299) (0.325) (0.316)  
       
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
    332087 332087 332087 332087   
Notes: The firm and individual data are drawn from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 1994-1998. The voting 
data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and 
firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
♮Significantly different from “commerce” at the 5% level; ♭ Significantly different from “banking” at the 5% 
level; ♯ Significantly different from “other” at the 5% level. 
 
